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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 Karl Ponds appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) of possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon and his sentence of 120-months’ imprisonment.  He argues 
that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction and, as such, that trial 
counsel was ineffective in not seeking a judgment of acquittal, (2) the District Court erred 
by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of justification, and (3) his sentence is 
unreasonable.  We will affirm. 
I. 
Background 
Philadelphia Police Officer Michael Tritz (“Tritz”) drove to the 5100 block of 
Arch Street with his partner, Officer Timothy Dougherty (“Dougherty”), in response to a 
radio call about a shooting.  As the officers pulled onto the block, Tritz turned on the 
vehicle’s high-powered spotlight.  He saw Karl Ponds (“Karl” or “Ponds”) on the 
sidewalk holding a gun in his right hand and his nephew William Ponds (“William”) a 
few feet away holding a drink.  
Tritz put the vehicle in park, jumped out with his weapon drawn, ordered Karl to 
get on the ground, and handcuffed him.  Tritz then collected the sawed-off shotgun that 
Karl had placed on the sidewalk.  Tritz walked Karl to the police car to search him, at 
which point Karl said, “This ain’t my gun. You didn’t see me with that.  If you’s going to 
put it on me, you can put it on me.”  Supp. App. at 11.  When Tritz searched Karl, he 
found a black and white adult-sized skeleton face mask in the back pocket of his pants.  
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Two weeks prior to this incident, Karl had been released from federal prison after serving 
a seven-year sentence for a previous conviction under § 922(g)(1). 
William was walking away from Karl when the officers arrived.  As Tritz 
apprehended Karl, Dougherty exited the vehicle and apprehended William.  Dougherty 
did not see either Karl or William holding the sawed-off shotgun, but he saw Tritz 
recover the gun from the ground where Karl had been standing.  William told the officers 
that he was the victim of the shooting earlier that evening.  He was later charged with 
possession of the shotgun. 
 Karl Ponds was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  At his jury trial, Ponds testified that the gun and ammunition 
belonged to William, who had retrieved them because “somebody was shooting at him.”  
Supp. App. 107-08, 117.  According to Ponds, he arrived at his sister’s house at 5137 
Arch Street and saw William coming down the steps with a gun in his hand.  Ponds 
admitted that he took the gun and placed it on the ground, but explained that he only did 
so because “I didn’t want [William] to accidentally shoot me because he was drinking” 
and “I was actually afraid that I might get shot with that gun.”  Supp. App. at 105, 118.  
Both before and after Ponds testified, the District Court and the parties discussed 
whether a jury instruction regarding the defense of justification would be appropriate.  
The Court ultimately granted the Government’s objection to the defense, concluding that 
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Ponds, did not establish the 
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immediacy element as defined by this court in United States v. Alston, 526 F.3d 91, 97 
(3d Cir. 2008).  Ponds was convicted.  
At the sentencing hearing, the Government moved for an upward departure from 
the Guidelines range of 92-115 months’ imprisonment, arguing that Ponds’ criminal 
history category was inadequate to reflect the seriousness of his past criminal conduct 
and his likelihood of committing future crimes.  The District Court denied the 
Government’s motion, but found that a “modest variance” of five months above the 
advisory Guidelines range was warranted based on Ponds’ “ironclad incorrigibility and 
utter lack of remorse.”  Supp. App. at 156-57.  The District Court thus sentenced Ponds to 
the statutory maximum term of 120-months imprisonment.  Ponds appeals his conviction 
and sentence.  
II. 
Analysis 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This court has 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
A.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Ponds argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a judgment of acquittal.  In reviewing 
claims as to the sufficiency of evidence, we draw all inferences in favor of the jury 
verdict.  See United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 329 (3d Cir. 2010).  Because Ponds did 
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not file a motion for acquittal, this court reviews his sufficiency claim under a plain error 
standard.  See United States v. Gordon, 290 F.3d 539, 547 (3d Cir. 2002).  
To establish that Ponds violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Ponds had a prior felony conviction punishable 
by more than one year imprisonment; (2) the firearm traveled in interstate commerce; and 
(3) Ponds “knowingly possessed” the firearm.  United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 344 
(3d Cir. 2000).  The first two elements were stipulated at trial, and Ponds contests only 
the sufficiency of the evidence of the “knowing possession” element.  To prove this 
element, the Government only needed to prove Ponds’ awareness that he possessed a 
firearm.  See id. 
 Karl Ponds testified that he “took the gun away [from William] and just placed it 
on the ground.”  Supp. App. at 105.  Even this brief possession of the firearm is sufficient 
to support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).  See, e.g., United States v. Mercado, 412 F.3d 
243, 251 (1st Cir. 2005) (evidence that a defendant “held the firearm for a few seconds” 
could properly support a § 922(g) conviction).  Ponds’ ineffective assistance claim thus 
also fails.
1
  See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 121 n.7 (3d Cir. 2009) (rejecting 
ineffective assistance claim where there was no merit to defendant’s underlying claim of 
error). 
                                              
1
 While this court generally does not entertain ineffective assistance claims on 
direct appeal, there is a “narrow exception” when the facts in the existing record are 
“sufficient to allow determination of ineffective assistance of counsel.”  United States v. 
Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991).   
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B.  Justification Defense 
 A defendant charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 
§ 922(g)(1) may succeed with a justification defense if he proves the following four 
elements by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) that the defendant or someone else 
was under unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily injury; (2) that the 
defendant did not recklessly place himself in a situation where he would be forced to 
engage in criminal conduct; (3) that the defendant had no reasonable legal alternative that 
would avoid both the criminal conduct and the threatened death or injury; and (4) that 
there was a direct causal relationship between the criminal act and the avoidance of the 
threatened harm.”  Dodd, 225 F.3d at 342 (citing United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 
540-41 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 Based on the evidence Ponds presented, he failed to demonstrate that an 
instruction as to the justification defense would be appropriate.  Ponds testified that he 
was worried that William would “accidentally” shoot him, but William did not threaten 
Karl, and the justification defense is only available “where the immediacy and specificity 
of the threat is compelling . . . .”  Alston, 526 F.3d at 96-97 (“The defendants who have 
been granted the defense faced split-second decisions where their lives, or the lives of 
others, were clearly at risk.”).  Additionally, Karl did not attempt to seek a legal 
alternative, such as asking William to put the gun down.  Given that Karl testified that he 
and William “both, at the same time, laid the shotgun on the ground,” Supp. App. at 113, 
this legal alternative may have been successful.  See Alston, 526 F.3d at 97 (“[A] 
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defendant cannot claim justification as a defense for an illegal action that he chose to 
pursue in the face of other potentially effective, but legal options.” (alteration in original, 
internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  Because Ponds failed to offer sufficient 
evidence as to two of the required elements of this defense, the District Court did not err 
by refusing to include an instruction to the jury regarding the defense of justification. 
C.  Reasonableness of Sentence 
 Ponds argues that the District Court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence 
of 120 months.  We review Ponds’ sentence for both procedural and substantive 
reasonableness.  See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  Review of the 
sentencing transcript reveals that the sentencing was procedurally sound, and the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a “modest variance” above the advisory 
Guidelines range was justified by the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.  Supp. App. at 156.  
Ponds’ 120-month statutory maximum sentence was neither procedurally nor 
substantively unreasonable, and is thus affirmed. 
III. 
Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
